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Abstract
There is a recurrent confl ict concerning law and judgment in the Catholic tradi-
tion. The tension between the manner in which just punitive judgments are to 
be rendered and the possibility of judging justly, if at all, is found frequently in 
Scripture and in Church history. This paper will give an overview of the dynam-
ics of this tension in Scripture and in the signifi cant disparities between natu-
ral law and more voluntaristic theories of law in the Middle Ages. It will then 
present current Catholic Social Teaching on this topic and offer suggestions as 
to how insights from the tradition may help clarify some of the problems in 
contemporary debates over the nature of law and the dynamics of sentencing.
Law, judgment, and punishment exacted for violations of law are matters of ut-
most importance in any society. They are also moral and spiritual issues with 
deep roots in Catholic theology. This essay will survey some of the principal 
ways these topics have been understood in the Catholic tradition. It will fi rst 
provide a brief overview of the phenomena of hyper-retribution and mass incar-
ceration in contemporary criminal justice, then proceed to a synopsis of three 
distinct strands in the Catholic tradition dealing with law and judgment: (1) 
Scripture and the moral quandary induced in those who judge; (2) natural law, 
its avowal of the divine legitimacy of positive law and its mechanism of judg-
ment for malefactors; and (3) elements of nominalism and “purely penal law” 
that in many instances present law primarily as an exercise of power and con-
trol rather than a mirror of the mind of God. This will be followed by a summary 
of recent Church teaching in which a coherent synthesis of these once disparate 
ideological strands has been achieved, doing much to inform and resolve some 
of the dilemmas being faced in the areas of criminal jurisprudence and punish-
ment. Finally, some suggestions will be offered as to how the topics raised in this 
essay might be investigated in the context of Catholic higher education.
Fractures in the Penal Landscape
It is diffi cult to conceive how society could function without a sys-
tem of law and legal accountability. Even those who take issue with 
Hobbes’s view that social life is a war of all against all would largely 
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concede that some form of punitive judgment and corporal restraint of 
wanton lawbreakers must be enforced to safeguard the life, liberty, and 
property of law-abiding citizens.1 Yet current criminal justice policy in 
the United States has reached a level of intervention and retribution 
that might have surprised even Hobbes: 2.3 million adults, more than 
one in every one hundred, are either in jail or in prison. This number 
easily surpasses the rates of incarceration of any other nation in the 
world, including China and Russia.2 Add to this the skyrocketing ex-
pansion of federal and state criminal codes, and one can see little reason 
to deny that this trend will continue into the foreseeable future.3 One 
law professor stated that we are coming ever closer to a situation “in 
which the law on the books makes everyone a felon.”4
The large-scale confi nement of a nation’s citizens is a pressing eth-
ical matter in itself, but the moral stakes are raised greatly when one 
considers the massive disparities in rates of incarceration between those 
with and without social and economic capital. Approximately one in ev-
ery three black males will enter jail or prison in his lifetime as compared 
to less than six percent of white males.5 There is a general social consen-
sus that inmates deserve not only long terms of imprisonment, but also 
whatever harm befalls them during their confi nement.6 The barely dis-
guised class and racial bias in the tailoring of the criminal class has 
perhaps found its most shameful expression in the appellation increas-
ingly used to describe contemporary corrections: “waste management.”7
What has been termed the “penal harm” movement has been 
fl anked by the still strong civic support for the death penalty. According 
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968) I, 3.
2 Pew Center on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008 (Washington, 
DC, 2008) 3, 5.
3 See Gene Healy, ed., Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Everything 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2004).
4 William J. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,” Michigan Law Re-
view 100 (2001): 505-600, at 508.
5 “About 1 in 3 black males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males, and 1 in 17 white males are ex-
pected to go to prison during their lifetime, if current incarceration rates remain un-
changed.” “Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001” http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf updating the report “Lifetime Likelihood of Going 
to State or Federal prison,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/llgsfp.pdf.
6 Alice Ristroph, “Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform,” Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 96 (2006): 1293-1352, at 1295.
7 See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 152-154.
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to David Garland there is a desire not only for rough justice, but “for 
consuming mediated images of offenders being put to death.”8 Garland 
likens this craving to the desire in the post-Reconstruction South for 
the public torture and lynching of blacks, particularly those accused of 
crimes against white women. He writes that “many of the same social 
functions performed by lynching then are performed by capital punish-
ment now; and much the same political structures that permitted lynch-
ings then, enable capital punishment now.”9
A number of scholars contend that the shameful state of affairs 
described above can be traced to the abandonment in modern jurispru-
dence of the religious and, in many ways specifi cally Catholic, roots of 
the Western legal tradition.10 The Catholic tradition generally, and spe-
cifi cally its legal legacy, provide a number of guidelines that challenge 
and, I will contend, correct how we view the guilty, judge them, and 
treat them once guilt has been established.
As the ethicist, Oliver O’Donovan, surmises, to judge another is to 
create a new public context.11 The position of the Catholic tradition is 
that the new “judgmental” context must fi rst reveal mercy and a belief 
in the infi nite and equal worth of every person, regardless of the crime. It 
is only in that framework that just laws can be enacted, just judgments 
rendered, just punishment created, and a just forgiveness offered. The 
following section will present a brief overview of law and judgment 
within the Catholic tradition.
Catholic Perspectives on Law and Judgment
There is something in the nature of the judgment of others, even 
the criminally guilty, that presents Christians with a serious quandary. 
How can I, a sinful person desperately in need of God’s mercy and 
8 David Garland, “The Peculiar Forms of American Capital Punishment,” Social Re-
search 74 (2007): 435-464, at 447, 457.
9 Ibid.
10 See, e.g., Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, trans., Lydia G. Co-
chrane, (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1995); Harold Berman, Law and 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Remi Brague, The Law 
of God, trans., Lydia G. Cochrane, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); N. E. 
Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Witte, Jr. 
and Frank S. Alexander, Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human 
Nature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
11 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s, 
2005), 7.
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION  –  27:1120
forgiveness, stand in judgment of another sinner? O’Donovan writes: “To 
step across into the role of the judge is to leave the position of evangeli-
cal strength and to enter the sphere of human weakness and political 
shame.”12 Despite this, the overriding concern of Catholic theological 
methodology has been to adopt not an either/or but a both/and approach 
to dilemmas like the one just posed. The Church confronts challenging 
conceptual dyads such as nature and grace, faith and reason, or free-
dom and obedience and fi nds in efforts to harmonize them a satisfying, 
though at times frustrating, reminder of the union of all things in Christ, 
and steadfastly refuses to succumb to ideological reductionism. More to 
the point, our fl awed human condition repeatedly affi rms the necessity 
of both mercy and punitive judgment. The fact that neither dialectical 
pole can be abandoned in Catholic thought has produced rich and diver-
gent constellations of ideas. Three of those constellations can be found 
in the biblical text, natural law, and in more subjectivist theories such 
as nominalism and purely penal law.
Law and Judgment in Scripture
Both those who favor and oppose a strong retributive juridic 
structure in the face of willful wrongdoing can fi nd abundant biblical 
warrant. St. John equates sin with lawlessness: “to sin is to break the 
law”13; while St. Paul states: “if you pass judgment you have no excuse. 
In judging others you condemn yourself.”14 Throughout Scripture one 
fi nds numerous laments about unjust judges and unjust laws. The 
psalmist cries: “Ignorant and senseless, they [judges] carry on blindly, 
undermining the very basis of earthly society.”15 Isaiah states: “Woe to 
those who enact unjust statutes . . . Depriving the needy of judgment 
and robbing my people’s poor of their rights.”16 Yet these denuncia-
tions of immoral judges and legislators who seek personal gain rather 
than justice, most often in cases involving the poor, in no way subvert 
the underlying contention that judgment is a necessary function or-
dained by God.17 Since there was no law before the sin of our fi rst 
12 Ibid., 86. While the quote does not capture the nuance of the Catholic position, 
it has rhetorical value in that it brings immediacy to the task of infusing human jus-
tice with the humility and forbearance featured so prominently in the Sermon on the 
Mount.
13 1 Jn 3:4.
14 Rom 2:1.
15 Ps 82:5.
16 Isa 10:1-2.
17 Dt 1:6-18.
LAW, JUDGEMENT, AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS 121
parents, the creation by God of judges to interpret and apply the law 
reveals not only divine recognition of the ineradicable duplicity of the 
human heart but also that the institution of government is insepara-
ble from the act of judgment.18
There are, however, countervailing moral directives. Abel’s blood 
does indeed cry to the heavens for justice19 but God’s response is to 
disavow vengeance, protecting Cain and cursing anyone who would 
dare to condemn God’s generous decision to provide him with safe pas-
sage and peaceful exile.20 Moreover, the author of Hebrews declares 
that God refuses to accept the human cry for justice, no matter how 
transparent the guilt of the offender: “the sprinkled blood of Jesus 
speaks more loudly than the blood of Abel.”21 In the Gospels, this pas-
sage from Hebrews is substantiated in what Christians proclaim as 
the culminating event in world history. This is the unimpeachable di-
rective, Christ’s refusal to pass judgment on his persecutors: “Father 
forgive them for they know not what they do.”22 The events preceding 
the passion repeatedly reveal the establishment by Jesus of a nonjudg-
mental reign in which Christians are to forgive those who trespass 
against them,23 in which the essential condition to receive divine for-
giveness is to render it to one’s debtors, oppressors, and enemies,24 and 
in which Christ himself declares, “Friend, who set me up as your judge 
or arbiter?”25
Mercy, therefore, is not what might be termed a supererogatory act 
(above and beyond the call of duty), but rather a foundational require-
ment of the Christian life.26 This is not only because the Lord com-
manded it but also because he made it apparent in his analogy of the 
splinter and the log. The human eye, so compromised in its own vision 
by the strain of sin, cannot see honestly the worth of others and the true 
meaning of their acts.27
18 Donovan, The Ways of Judgment, 3-4.
19 Gen 4:10.
20 Ibid, 4:14-15.
21 Heb 12:24.
22 Lk 23:34.
23 Mt 6:12.
24 Lk 6:27-38; Mt 18:21-35.
25 Lk 12:13-14.
26 Matthew Myer Boulton, “Samaritan Justice: A Theology of Mercy in the ‘Neighbor-
hood’ ” in Jonathan Rothchild et al, eds., Doing Justice to Mercy (Charlottesville, VA: 
University of Virginia Press, 2007), 129-144.
27 Mt 7:3-5.
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St. Ambrose, commenting on Paul’s famous insistence that Chris-
tians can fi nd neither freedom nor salvation in obedience to law, wrote:
Paul says, “through the law I died to the law, that I might live to God;” which 
is to say that through the spiritual law he is dead to the material interpreta-
tion of the law. Let us, too, by the law of our Lord Jesus Christ, die to this law 
which gives authority to treacherous decrees! Faith in Christ, not law, founded 
the church.”28
Yet St. Paul also urges the Christians in Corinth to “hand over to 
Satan” the community congregant sleeping with his stepmother.29 They 
are to guard steadfastly the moral integrity of the faith community by 
enforcing the strict disciplinary requirements of the Gospel and refusing 
fellowship with those in defi ance of them.30 The Gospels also establish a 
clear procedure for judgment of sinful Christians31 as well as the author-
ity of binding and loosing (excommunication and forgiveness) conferred 
upon the apostles.32 Finally, Paul sets the tone for subsequent Christian 
defense of the political order and its offi ce of judgment and prosecution 
in his famous counsel: that Christians must obey all governing authori-
ties, not only because they are instituted by God but also because their 
swift and terrible repression of the sinful and disobedient reveals God’s 
own recognition of such policy as a necessary social requirement.33
This rich and divergent set of biblical claims could hardly yield a 
single and settled understanding of law and judgment. Indeed, the 
clashes among seminal and infl uential thinkers on these matters sur-
faced early in Catholic tradition and reverberate to our own day.
Law, Society, and Judgment as Natural
Catholic social thought has been deeply infl uenced by the natural 
law.34 For example, since the beginning of modern Catholic Social Teaching 
28 St. Ambrose, “Sermon against Auxentius” in Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood 
O’Donovan, eds. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s, 1999), 72.
29 1Cor 5:5.
30 Rom 16:17; 1 Cor 6:9-10.
31 Mt 18:15-18.
32 Ibid., 16:19; 18:18.
33 Rom 13:1-4.
34 Natural law is an ancient ethical formula, dating back to the Greeks and evident 
in the thinking of St. Paul (cf Rom 2:14-15). In a more formal sense, the declaration by 
Gregory VII in 1075 of the independence of the church from secular infl uence inaugu-
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(CST) with the publication of Rerum novarum in 1891, virtually every 
social encyclical up to and including the papacy of Paul VI derived its 
implicit, if not explicit, foundation from this stance.35 The fact that 
these encyclicals are addressed not only to Catholics but “to all men 
[and women] of good will” implies fundamental tenets of the natural 
law. Among these are: that reason is compromised, but not inherently 
corrupted, by sin; that one’s faith stance is not a detriment to the assent 
to the proclamation of truth; and that positive law, properly promul-
gated and ordained to the common good of all citizens, must be obeyed 
and its violation curtailed by state intervention.36
In the mid-twelfth century, Rufi nus the Canonist wrote that natu-
ral law “is a kind of natural propulsion, implanted by nature in each 
person, to do good and avoid evil.”37 Virtually identical is the descrip-
tion provided by St. Thomas Aquinas.38 Gratian, the twelfth century 
monk and fi rst architect of Canon law, begins his seminal work, The 
Decretum, with these words: “The human race is ruled by two [means] 
namely natural law and usages. Natural law is what is contained in the 
Law and the Gospel by which each is commanded to do to another what 
he wants done to himself.”39 In the fi fteenth century, Nicholas of Kues, 
echoing Aquinas, drew these timeless conclusions for our topic: “All leg-
islation is based on the natural law and any law which contradicts it 
cannot be valid. Hence since natural law is naturally based on reason, 
all law is rooted by nature in the reason of man.”40
rated the creation of canon law and a universal set of Catholic teachings and beliefs, 
many of which reveal the infl uence of natural law.
35 Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 23-37.
36 St. Thomas wrote that law is an ordinance of reason, promulgated by due author-
ity, and ordained to the common good. See Summa Theologica, trans., Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, (New York: Benziger, 1947), I-II, Q. 90, a. 4. There are 
several collections of Catholic social encyclicals. See, e.g, Joseph Gremillion, ed. Gospel 
of Justice and Peace (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976); David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 
eds., Renewing the Earth (Garden City, NY: Image, 1977). On the natural law within the 
tradition, see Stephen J. Pope, “Natural Law in Catholic Social Teachings” in Kenneth 
R. Himes, ed., Modern Catholic Social Teaching (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 41-71.
37 Rufi nus the Canonist, “Summa Decretorum” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to 
Grotius, 300.
38 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 94, a. 2.
39 Quoted in Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1997), 58.
40 Nicholas of Kues, “The Catholic Concordance” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to 
Grotius, 544.
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The lasting importance of this concept is virtually assured; it still 
is invoked widely among intellectuals as a foundational legal and moral 
philosophy. It also inspires socially committed men and women in every 
generation with its contention that law must be honored because it is 
an inherently moral reality and that “inquiry into the nature of law is 
ultimately a form of moral inquiry.”41
Such a formulation provides a direct challenge to the dominant 
philosophy of legal positivism in our own day with its fully pragmatic 
and procedural appraisal of law’s meaning and content.42 Natural law 
thinkers maintain that public adherence to the demands of law is not a 
result of cost-benefi t analysis or other materialist motives. It results 
from the virtues inculcated in citizens through family, church, and civic 
association that enable the will to consent to what reason affi rms: that 
law establishes the order and justice essential to both human and spir-
itual fulfi llment.43 Law is not simply “what we do around here” but a 
necessary institution for the protection and fostering of the common 
good.44 This formal characteristic is of the utmost value when force and 
judgment must be levied upon those who neglect or deviate from the 
moral consensus underlying legal statutes.
Justice demands that lawbreakers be punished. The basic justifi ca-
tion for the infl iction of corporal detention is that harm caused to others 
through disregard for law is doubly culpable. The fi rst violation is vio-
lence to others and, by extension, to the whole community; the second is 
a disruption of the perfect order established by God in creation. Pre-
eminent thinkers such as St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Peter 
Abelard were in near perfect agreement in this understanding.45
True to the Catholic tradition and its commitment to dialectical bal-
ance, however, justice is barely recognizable without equity and mercy. 
41 Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea, 6.
42 Richard Posner, a leading scholar in what has been termed the “Chicago School” 
in both law and economics has written: “the common law is best understood as a pric-
ing mechanism designed to bring about an effi cient allocation of resources.” See George 
E. Garvey, “A Catholic Social Teaching Critique of Law” in Michael W. McConnell et al., 
Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 224-
240 at 228.
43 “The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually.” 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 96, a. 2.
44 N. E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 10, 14.
45 D. E. Luscombe, trans., Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 89; Joseph 
M. Colleran, trans., Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man (Albany: Magi Books, 
1969), I, 11; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 87, a.6.
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Aquinas followed Aristotle in his contention that pure legal justice, such 
as one fi nds in American courts today with sentencing grids and manda-
tory minimum sentences, is inferior to particular justice where the mag-
istrate takes the circumstances of the case into account and judges with 
equity.46 Implied here is a recognition that wrong must be seen in the 
context of the subject’s own story and cannot become the controlling fac-
tor in the judgment rendered for a legal infraction.47 This personal 
approach is echoed in recent Catholic theology by Karl Rahner who ob-
serves that sin is a “permanent existential” and indelible part of the 
human condition. This results from the inevitable constraints not only 
on human freedom but also on each person’s ability to determine the 
proper course of action due to the limitations of knowledge, heredity, and 
other powerful instrumental factors.48 In accord with justice as conceived 
in the Sermon on the Mount, this innate fallibility requires those who 
judge to temper righteous indignation with humility and compassion.49
Classic natural law theory always contains an element of subjec-
tivity. Aquinas wrote that there was room for wide variation the more 
one moved from general precepts of natural law (do good, avoid evil; 
respect life; seek the truth and the common welfare; worship God), to 
application of these in specifi c cultural locales and situations.50
This was most cogently presented by his use of epikeia. The concept 
of epikeia was recovered in the revival of interest in early Greek philosophy 
during the Middle Ages. It has infl uenced Catholic thinkers extensively 
and not without controversy. Epikeia means that in cases of doubt as to 
how a precept is to be applied, one has the moral and social freedom to 
interpret how the lawgivers might have responded had they encoun-
tered the same situation.
Giles of Rome wrote that there are three ways doubts could arise 
concerning the binding force of a statute: “The fi rst is when certain cas-
es arise which are as it were outside the laws . . . Second . . . when cer-
tain cases arise in which it is diffi cult to observe the laws . . . Third, 
46 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 58. a. 7; J. A. K. Thompson, trans., Aristotle, 
Ethics (Hammondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1955), II, 7.
47 Alice Ristroph approximates this commitment in her advocacy of what she terms 
“holistic” retributivism. See “Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform,” 1342.
48 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans., William V. Dych, (New York: 
The Seabury Press, 1978), 104.
49 See Kevin Jung, “Fallibility and Fragility” in Rothchild et al, Doing Justice to Mercy, 
206-221.
50 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 96, a. 6.
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judgments of judges are wont to vary by reason of doubtfulness.”51 Aqui-
nas’ own reverence for law placed moral constraints upon the judgment 
rendered by the doubtful subject, lest it become a justifi cation for li-
cense, but he still placed epikeia within the purview of legal equity and 
maintained that it was as much an element of justice as the mandate of 
the judge to punish criminal acts.52
Thus the second attempt by Catholic thinkers to balance law and 
judgment sought, fi nally, to bring harmony to freedom and mercy on one 
hand, and to order, obedience, and judgment on the other. Despite its im-
pressive intellectual merits, some important interpreters of the natural 
law took a much more subjective reading of law and judgment. Their in-
sights have had a legal and social impact that extends to the present day.
Nominalism and Purely Penal Law
St. Francis is one of the most revered spiritual fi gures of all time. 
His love of all creation, radical poverty, and repudiation of violence con-
tinue to inspire men and women today as in preceding generations. 
Francis is rarely thought of in revolutionary terms, but his thoughts 
concerning rights, law, and human freedom unleashed a storm of con-
troversy whose infl uence has been decisive in the evolution of these 
concepts. Francis and his followers were a literal “cradle of rights doc-
trines.” They were radical exemplars of personalism and individualism 
in their reduction of the cosmic to the particular. In fact, for Francis and 
the movement he generated, the cosmic was the particular as each living 
being embodied the fullness of the divine and summoned the care and 
devotion directed to the divine.53
St. Bonaventure (d. 1274) was the fi rst to translate the Franciscan 
ethos of absolute poverty into a legal theory and it came to the fore subse-
quently in a confl ict with Pope John XXII over whether the Franciscans 
had a “right” to own anything and, therefore, whether Christ and the dis-
ciples did as well. The Franciscans said no and the Pope said yes.54 The 
51 Giles of Rome, “On Ecclesiastical Power,” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to Grotius, 
376.
52 “In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the 
letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the 
object of ‘epikeia’ which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that ‘epikeia’ is a virtue.” 
Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 120, a. 1.
53 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 35.
54 Ibid., 94ff. See also, A. S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 4-24.
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controversy is fascinating and bears strongly on our topic in that one of 
the most brilliant of the Friars, William of Ockham, took a public stand in 
defense of the order and against the pontiff. Ockham’s defense was based 
on two concepts. The fi rst dealt with the absolute sovereignty of God and 
presented a core nominalist principle, namely that the divine will is inde-
pendent of any human understanding or control. As Tierney states, sum-
marizing Ockham: “God could create an alternative universe of values in 
which adultery, stealing and lying might be virtuous.”55 This leads to 
Ockham’s second thesis: the descending order of authority from God to 
humans (via the natural law) and, by extension, to legitimate government 
(via the human law) was baseless and invalid. “I claim that positive moral 
science, e.g., the science used by jurists, is not a demonstrative science in 
many ways. For the arguments of jurists are based on positive human 
laws, which do not include evidently known propositions.”56 He believed 
that the only moral principles concerning government that God communi-
cated directly to human reason were those contained in the Bible. In these, 
the authority of rulers (other than the people of God) was not accorded 
clear origin.57 For example, Christ accepted Pilate’s authority to condemn 
him to death but in no way suggested approval or endorsement of the 
moral legitimacy of Roman rule.58 In reference to the Franciscan dispute, 
Ockham argued that the Franciscans (and, a fortiori, Christ) had no posi-
tive legal right to the objects they used, but possessed a natural right 
common to all to use the things of the earth. Therefore, natural rights cre-
ate just actions even in the absence of a right guaranteed by law.59
Certainly, Scripture provides “right reason” (reason guided by vir-
tue), a tool in the determination of which laws are justly imposed, but 
Ockham broadened the subjective determination of rightful conduct far 
more than did Aquinas with the concept of epikeia.
55 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 98.
56 William of Ockham, Quodlibetical Questions Vol. I, trans., Alfred J. Freddoso and 
Francis E. Kelley, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Q. 14, a. 3.
57 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 98. See also, Hamilton, Political Thought in 
Sixteenth-Century Spain, 25.
58 Ockham was not opposed to the coercive function of law. The chief function of gov-
ernment in his opinion was the negative one of restraining evildoers. This capacity, 
however, was not an expression of divine ordinance. McGrade, The Political Thought of 
William of Ockham, 101, 115.
59 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 121, 130. Ockham stated: “But for the sake 
of necessity it is permissible to act against a divine commandment, even one that is 
explicit, in things not evil in themselves but evil only because they are prohibited.” See 
William of Ockham, “A Dialogue on Papal and Royal Dignity” in O’Donovan, From 
Irenaeus to Grotius, 461-62.
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The issues of poverty and ownership in this dispute were a catalyst 
for the spreading of the idea of rights as a power of free persons and not 
simply as objective determinations of conduct contained in the law. The 
words of St. Paul were echoed in the controversy: “All things are licit for 
me.”60 Proponents of this movement understood Scripture differently 
than those of natural law. This resulted in a loosening of the unques-
tioned moral legitimacy of law, its mechanism of judgment, and the pun-
ishment infl icted upon those who hold it in contempt.
The other challenge to natural law, one as formidable as that of 
Ockham, came at the end of the sixteenth century from the Spanish 
Jesuit, Francisco Suarez. With his theory of “purely penal law” he paved 
the way for many of the basic assumptions held by contemporary jurists.
An intellectual descendent of both Aquinas and Ockham, Suarez 
was committed to a course that would harmonize the natural law with 
the growing emphasis on rights as a power inherent in the individual. 
Unlike his traditional contemporaries, his theory contended that the 
sovereignty of the ruler and the laws enacted by the ruler were substan-
tiated not by a direct donation of power from God but by will and con-
sent.61 Suarez maintained that in seeking to enact a law, the ruler would 
fi rst determine the various alternatives according to the end established 
for government (service to the common good). In this, he was standing 
directly in the shadow of Aquinas. But then Suarez argued that the fi -
nal decision resided not in the reason but in the will of the sovereign 
who determines the given law and commands all subjects to obey it.62 
His overall legal theory can be summed up in the following comment on 
international law: “The law of nations is constitutive, not demonstrative 
of evil. It does not forbid things because they are evil, but makes them 
evil by forbidding them.”63
Suarez cannot be accused of encouraging lawlessness; he had a 
fi rm commitment to the legitimacy of government, particularly when 
subjects gave their consent to the political order.64 In stunning contrast 
60 1 Cor 10:23.
61 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 301-302.
62 Law is thus founded on two acts of the will: fi rst the decision concerning the decree 
(electio), then the command to obey (usus). See David Cowan Bayne, Conscience, Obliga-
tion, and the Law (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1966), 41-42.
63 Francisco Suarez, “Laws and God the Lawgiver” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to 
Grotius, 727-28.
64 Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain, 51; Jose Pereira, Suarez: 
Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 
88-89.
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to natural law theorists, however, was his contention that law, an act 
fi nally of the will rather than reason, does not morally bind in con-
science.65 Repeating a phrase that dates at least from Gregory the 
Great, Suarez argued that the sovereign punished “sine culpa, non 
tamen sine causa” (without fault, not however without cause).66 This 
means that a legislator may justly punish disobedience but the guilt of 
the perpetrator is nonmoral and purely political. Herein lies the foun-
dation of Suarez’s conception of purely penal law and the freedom of the 
conscience in relation to it: “It can be proven, however, that strictly 
speaking those who violate purely penal law are not guilty of sin . . . 
because that which follows from an honest conscience is not sin.”67
This is similar to the philosophy of those who practice civil disobe-
dience to what they determine to be unjust laws, and accept the punish-
ment meted out for that stance. Suarez argued that there was a moral 
obligation in promulgated law but that obligation resided in submitting 
to the penalty not to any ontological truth in the law’s command.68
We began this section with the sense that the antinomy in Scrip-
ture between just penal judgment and the freedom of the Christian in 
all, save mercy and forgiveness, would yield a similar harvest of ideo-
logical dualism among subsequent generations of Christians. Having 
discussed some of the variations in legal interpretation within the tra-
dition, we now proceed to summarize how current CST has drawn from 
each of those perspectives to present a comprehensive ethical vision of 
law and judgment that has immediate relevance for the conceptual and 
practical fl aws in current criminal justice practices.
Law and Judgment in Current Catholic Social Thought
Catholic Social Thought, whether in doctrinal texts or in the social 
encyclicals, contains a strong bias in favor of the legitimacy of govern-
ment, its right to judge illegal behavior, and its moral authority to pun-
ish the culpable: “In order to protect the common good, the lawful public 
authority must exercise the right and duty to infl ict punishments ac-
cording to the seriousness of the crimes committed.”69 This notion is 
65 It is noteworthy that in locating freedom in the will, Suarez references both 
Bonaventure and Ockham. See Bayne, Conscience, Obligation, and the Law, 44.
66 Ibid, 45-46.
67 Quoted in Bayne, Conscience, Obligation, and the Law, 48.
68 Ibid., 47.
69 United States Catholic Conference, Inc.—Liberia Editrice Vaticana, Catechism of 
the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 2266.
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ancient, not only found in Scripture but also throughout the tradition of 
the Church. Irenaeus wrote at the turn of the third century: “For since 
man, by departing from God . . . engaged in every sort of disordered con-
duct . . . God imposed upon mankind the fear of man . . . in order that, 
being subjected to the authority of men, and under custody of their laws, 
they might attain to some degree of justice.”70 Aquinas argued that the 
fi nal end of each person, union with God, was dependent on the training 
in the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance), a task 
in which the state and its laws were primary agents.71
This positive designation of the state as a necessary moral force in 
both civic and Christian life does not, however, summarily dismiss the 
more pragmatic or opportunistic view suggested in the thought of fi gures 
like Ockham and Suarez. Beginning with the encyclicals of Pope John 
Paul II, the pre-eminence of natural law (and its descending logic of le-
gitimate authority) has given way to a more phenomenological approach 
to social questions. While revering the natural law, Pope John Paul II 
was often highly critical of the injustices in modern society. He also 
echoed Catholic theological convictions concerning the reality of social 
sin, specifi cally, how the institutions of society, legal institutions among 
them, mask a draconian assault on the vulnerable beneath a rhetoric of 
freedom and respect for the common good. Offi cially, the recognition of 
the reality of social sin was fi rst seen with the publication of Gaudium et 
spes during the Second Vatican Council: “To be sure, the disturbances 
which so frequently occur in the social order result in part from natural 
tensions . . . But at a deeper level they fl ow from man’s pride and selfi sh-
ness, which contaminate even the social sphere. When the structure of 
affairs is fl awed by the consequences of sin, man, already born with a 
bent toward evil, fi nds there new inducements to sin, which cannot be 
overcome without strenuous efforts and the assistance of grace.”72
For his part, John Paul II wrote that “structures” of sin “opposed to 
the will of God” and “the good of neighbor” manifest themselves in two 
70 Irenaeus of Lyons, “Against Heresies” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to Grotius, 17.
71 “[The] governance of every provident ruler is ordered either to the attainment, or 
the increase, or the preservation of the perfection of the things governed.” St. Thomas 
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, trans., Vernon J. Burke, (Garden City, NY: 
Image Books, 1956), III, 73, 2. “[S]ociety must have the same end as the individual man. 
Therefore, it is not the ultimate end of the assembled multitude to live virtuously, but 
through virtuous living to attain the possession of God.” On the Governance of Rulers, 
trans., Gerald B. Phelan, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), I, 14.
72 “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” (Gaudium et spes) in 
Walter M. Abbott, ed. The Documents of Vatican II (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 25.
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principal ways: “On the one hand, the all-consuming desire for profi t, 
and on the other, the thirst for power, with the intention of imposing 
one’s will upon others. In order to characterize better each of these at-
titudes, one can add the expression, ‘at any price’.”73
These ideas concerning both the legitimacy and sinfulness of the 
state’s legal and punitive functions reveal that current CST has ab-
sorbed the best ideas contained in the Church’s intellectual heritage, 
regardless of the tensions that appear to rule out their harmonious 
union. In effect, this binding of apparent opposites traces back to the 
New Testament, as we noted in the fi rst section.
Another theme in current Church teaching, a close parallel to the 
one just discussed, is the goal of reconciling judgment and punishment 
with mercy and forgiveness. Whether one approaches willful breaches 
of the social contract from the perspective of natural law or purely penal 
law, the plain-sense view of the tradition is that one must accept the 
punishment for one’s actions, even if such actions are in accord with a 
properly formed conscience.74 The tradition also fi rmly insists that mor-
al constraints be placed upon the structures of criminal justice to abjure 
prejudice, to judge leniently, to encourage remorse rather than infl ict 
pain, and to offer forgiveness to the repentant offender: “There is a two-
fold purpose here. On the one hand, encouraging the re-insertion of the 
condemned person into society; on the other, fostering a justice that 
reconciles, a justice capable of restoring harmony in social relationships 
disrupted by the criminal act committed.”75
We have already noted that even for those convinced that the state 
ultimately executes God’s own justice, equity was considered an inte-
gral part of justice. Gregory the Great stated that “all who are over oth-
ers ought to consider in themselves not the authority of their rank, but 
the equality of their condition, and rejoice not to be over man, but to do 
73 John Paul II, On Social Concern (Solicitudo rei socialis) (Boston: St. Paul Books, 
1987), 37.
74 Augustine argued that Christians must make use of the “peace of Babylon” and 
obey all laws of the earthly city since even bands of robbers desire to live in peace. He 
extended this duty of obedience to include those who were being unjustly punished. See 
St. Augustine, City of God, trans., Henry Bettenson, (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 
1984), XIX, 12; I, 9. Similarly, Aquinas stated that without order “the benefi t of social 
life is lost” and that the innocent ought to accept punishment for the sake of the com-
mon good. See On the Governance of Rulers, I, 2; Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 42, a. 2. 
See also, Bayne, Conscience, Obligation, and the Law, 47.
75 Pontifi cal Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2005), 403.
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them good.”76 In the Middle Ages, John of Salisbury wrote that “the 
uncorrupted judge is one whose determination is on the basis of the as-
siduous contemplation of the image of equity.”77
These common beliefs of our theological and spiritual forebears in 
the Catholic tradition are accompanied by a fi nal one that bears par-
ticular relevance in today’s penal climate. The infl iction of pain on an-
other, although done in compliance with laws agreed upon by common 
consent, is a sober and fearsome task that requires a humble and peni-
tential reverence to God as the ultimate judge and to those upon whom 
righteous vengeance must fall. James Whitman has noted that the mod-
ern legal framework, in which witnesses are compelled to offer evidence 
of fault and juries to pronounce the defendant culpable and worthy of 
punishment, is not a result of democratic reform but coercion. Our judi-
cial and legislative ancestors, well aware of the Gospel’s directive to 
refrain from judging others lest a similar judgment be levied by God 
against them, initiated the method whereby common people, reluctant 
as the ruling authorities to condemn others, were forced under threat of 
penal sanction, to put their own souls in jeopardy so as not to endanger 
the salvation of their lords.78
This long-standing recognition of the deep ambiguity of punishing 
others can be found in current Catholic Social Teaching where a holistic 
approach to sentencing is encouraged, one that takes into account not 
only an appropriate punishment for offenses committed but also the 
well-being of offenders, their families, and their communities of origin. 
Furthermore, the Church espouses a restorative approach to justice in 
which a proper restitution can be made to the victim after a mediated 
interchange. The hope is that there will be closure for those affected by 
the crime as well as forgiveness and restoration.79
In their recent presentation of a Catholic perspective on criminal 
justice, the Catholic Bishops of the United States integrate the various 
lines of historical speculation on law and judgment into a theory capa-
ble of providing a searing and constructive critique of current justice 
dynamics. At the Scriptural level, the bishops embrace the divine call 
76 Gregory the Great, “Pastoral Rule” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to Grotius, 197.
77 John of Salisbury, “Policraticus” in O’Donovan, From Irenaeus to Gortius, 283.
78 James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008).
79 See Catholic Bishops of the United States, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Res-
toration (Washington, DC: U. S. Catholic Conference, 2000), 28-41; Compendium of the 
Social Doctrine of the Church, 403.
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for both justice and mercy: “Just as God never abandons us, so too we 
must be in covenant with one another. We are all sinners, and our re-
sponse to sin and failure should not be abandonment and despair, but 
rather justice, contrition, reparation, and return or reintegration of all 
into the community.”80 They honor the natural law “that resides within 
the hearts of individuals” and uphold the traditional emphasis on gov-
ernment as executor of God’s moral law: “We cannot and will not toler-
ate behavior that threatens lives and violates the rights of others. We 
believe in responsibility, accountability, and legitimate punishment . . . 
The community has a right to establish and enforce laws to protect peo-
ple and to advance the common good.”81 Yet, they also reinforce the op-
position to irresponsible and unjust governance so pronounced in con-
temporary CST, echoing the counsel of Ockham and Suarez. The bishops 
lament the “racism and discrimination” that haunt not only our nation 
but also our penal system and they decry the “rigid formulations” that 
now defi ne sentencing policy and the “failure” of severely punitive legis-
lation enacted for many youthful offenders.82
With this fi rm yet generous understanding of justice, judgment, 
and law, the Catholic tradition, particularly in the remarkable synthe-
sis achieved in current social doctrine, can offer much to the cynical, 
punitive, and overly selective approach to criminal justice practiced to-
day in the courtrooms of the United States. The current positivist ap-
proach provides law with only two attributes: a rigorous scientifi c meth-
odology and a commitment to law as nothing more than the rules 
established at a given place and time and enforced by the courts.83 It is 
summed up in the writing of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who did so 
much to steer American jurisprudence in a positivist direction and to 
deny any foundational meaning to the legal process. Holmes stated: “I 
should be glad if we could get rid of the whole moral phraseology which 
I think has tended to distort the law.”84
In effect, legal positivism reintroduces a purely penal approach to 
law but one stripped of the commitments of its founders. In its current 
form, compliance is secured through a combination of state power and 
appeal to the self-interest, not the moral conscience, of the citizenry.85 
80 Catholic Bishops, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, 18.
81 Ibid., 20, 16.
82 Ibid., 28.
83 Witte and Alexander, The Teachings of Modern Christianity, I, xxii.
84 Quoted in Bayne, Conscience, Obligation, and the Law, 21.
85 John Witte, Jr., God’s Joust, God’s Justice (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s, 
2006), 289.
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It takes an agnostic view of what Suarez, Ockham, and Aquinas all held 
in the deepest regard: the inviolable sacredness of each human life. It 
fails to replicate the complex moral system of fi gures such as Ockham 
and Suarez who steadfastly delineated the difference between law as an 
act of willful power and law as a legitimate refl ection of Scriptural truth 
and a communal desire to foster harmony, order, and justice.86
In similar fashion, some contemporary legal theorists have noted 
the distinct impact of canon law (deeply ingrained as it is with natural 
law theory) upon the foundations of Western legal systems, and argue 
that a similar transcendent legal ethos must be re-embraced. Their ar-
gument (following Aquinas) is that law functions according to its true 
nature when it aims to uplift the quality of life of all citizens. Civic com-
pliance to law is not a function of law’s power to coerce but its ability to 
evoke a truthful conception of the good life that all who are rational af-
fi rm in the depths of their being.87 Finally, recent historical accounts of 
the development of the judicial system reveal that contemporary court-
room dynamics were determined in large part by a biblically inspired 
fear to face the terrible burden of passing judgment, rather than through 
humanist cries for democratic procedure.
There is much convincing evidence that the current economy of 
criminal justices suffused with racial and class bias, is overly punitive, 
and lacks the ability to summon from the populace a sense of moral 
regard for legislative enactments. This paper has suggested that part of 
the reason for these failures can be traced to a lack of knowledge about 
and appreciation for the tradition responsible for much of the legal 
structure. A second explanation lies in the critical failure to acknowl-
edge that law can neither bind us to the obligations and sacrifi ces it 
entails nor dispense true justice without an a priori commitment to the 
inestimable worth of every human life.
The CST has bequeathed to us a legal philosophy that is both spec-
ulative and practical. It cherishes law, properly promulgated, but con-
tains a host of checks upon irresponsible and self-serving legislation. It 
sanctions the judgment and punishment of malefactors but rejects ret-
ribution lacking in attentiveness to individual circumstance and forget-
ful of the mercy owed to all. Finally, it makes an assertion that is not 
legal but theological in origin, namely that every life is sacred. It is this 
86 Ockham, for instance, fi rmly believed that law was necessary to curb the evil ten-
dencies of human nature while, at the same time, promoting and defending human 
freedom. See McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham, 213-215.
87 Berman, Law and Revolution, 16-18; Brague, The Law of God, 256-64.
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latter commitment that gives law its meaning and justice its force; and 
without it, no law can bind and no judgment can be just.
Implications for Catholic Higher Education
The Catholic faith community assures its vibrancy by a continual 
conversation with its past. Scholars have noted that the real test for all 
institutions, not to mention human beings, is their ability to weather 
epistemological crises, that is, to face honestly and openly, new and chal-
lenging information. The strongest institutions and people rely on a 
faith that sees everything as gift.88
Catholic social ethics deserves a cherished place in the academic 
curriculum not only because it directs itself consciously to the most 
pressing ethical issues of our day, but also because it confronts them 
from a unifi ed and unique perspective, grounded in social responsibility 
and eschatological hope. Since the Western legal tradition and its meth-
ods of criminal sanction both derive from movements and theological 
developments within the Church, a focused study of CST in these vital 
areas can provide students with the intellectual resources necessary to 
guide contemporary society in its quest to craft an effective and redemp-
tive system of criminal justice.
88 See Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981) 129-152; “The Nonviolent Terrorist: In Defense of Christian 
Fanaticism” in Michael L. Budde and Robert W. Brimlow, eds. The Church as Counter-
culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) 89-104; John Milbank, Being 
Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003).

